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Abstract 
In this paper, I address the issue of how to best account from a philosophical point of view for 
the diversity of our (synchronic) mental activities. The discussion starts with Mark Textor’s 
mental monism, defended in his book Brentano’s Mind. According to mental monism, our 
mental life is constituted by just one simple mental act, in which different sub-acts – e.g. 
seeing, hearing, and self-consciousness – can be conceptually distinguished. Textor grounds 
this view in the work of the early Brentano and contrasts it with the theory of the later 
Brentano, who introduces a mental substance into his philosophy of mind. According to 
Textor, Brentano needs a substance because he is unable to explain how mental monism can 
account for the separability of our mental activities, for example, the fact that I can stop 
hearing F while still seeing blue. Textor argues, however, that mental monism can solve this 
problem. I address two issues regarding Textor’s view. First, I challenge his interpretation of 
the early Brentano by arguing that Brentano imports not conceptual, but ontological 
complexity into our mental life; I defend Brentano’s view against possible criticisms, and I 
address some objections to mental monism. Second, I oppose Textor’s narrative about 
Brentano’s adoption of mental substance. I argue that Brentano needs a substance not to 
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explain separability, but rather to individuate our mental acts. I still argue, however, that 
Brentano’s earlier view (understood in my sense) is better than the substance account for 
dividing the mind. 
 
1. Introduction 
Mark Textor’s Brentano’s Mind (2017a) is an exciting attempt to construct a philosophy of 
mind on the basis of Brentano’s work. As Textor emphasises at the beginning of his book, his 
aim is not to give a historical presentation of Brentano’s thought, but to do philosophy in a 
Brentanian manner. He wants to ‘bring out something true and philosophically illuminating in 
Brentano’s thinking about the mind, in a historically informed way’, hoping to ‘preserve the 
spirit and often enough the letter of Brentano’s work’ (2017a, 6–7). A fascinating result of 
this approach is how much of the contemporary theoretical debate Textor is able to address 
and how many issues in this debate he is equipped to solve with the help of Brentano. It 
connects the work of Brentano with current debates in a way that has rarely been achieved, 
and contributes to show the continued relevance of Brentanian philosophy. 
Textor’s book explores two problems: ‘the nature of the mind’ and ‘the structure of 
consciousness’ (2017a, 6). With respect to the first problem, Textor carefully goes through 
Brentano’s account, and ultimately rejects it in favour of Husserl’s: the ‘mark of the mental’ 
is not, as Brentano famously defended, intentionality, that is, a specific directedness of our 
mental acts towards objects, but the fact that the mental is never given via modes of 
presentation. I will not address this point much further, but will focus on the other problem 
that Textor discusses, that of the structure of consciousness, with regard to which he aims to 
develop a genuinely Brentanian position. Textor defends what he calls ‘mental monism’, that 
is, the thesis that all our (simultaneously occurring) mental acts, including self-consciousness, 
or ‘awareness’ as he calls it, are one and the same entity – that is, they are ontologically 
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identical – but can be conceptually distinguished when considered in relation to their different 
objects. Textor attributes this account to the early Brentano, and defends it against Brentano’s 
own later theory, in which a substance is introduced into the picture, and our mental acts are 
considered to be distinct entities, or more precisely, distinct accidents, which are nonetheless 
unified by the fact that they share one and the same bearer. According to Textor, this change 
of mind was due to the fact that Brentano took mental monism to be unable to account for the 
separability of our mental activities, for example, the fact that I can stop hearing F while still 
seeing blue. Textor, by contrast, thinks that mental monism is able to do so, and rejects the 
substance view. 
I will challenge Textor on two points. First, I will question Textor’s interpretation of 
the early Brentano. I will argue that mental acts in Brentano are unitary items made up of a 
series of so-called ‘divisives’, which are ontologically distinct, though not discrete parts of the 
act; I will also defend Brentano’s view against possible criticism, and will address some 
objections to Textor’s mental monism. Second, in a somewhat shorter section, I will argue 
against Textor’s narrative about Brentano’s adoption of mental substance. I will show that the 
reason why Brentano needs a substance is in order to individuate our mental acts. However, I 
will also argue that Brentano’s former position, that without such a substance, is a 
philosophically better option for dividing the mind. 
 
2. Divisions of the Mind 
a. Brentano and Textor, Ontological Complexity and Mental Monism 
The early Brentano developed a ‘psychology without a soul’ (1924, 16). Our awareness of our 
mental life does not reveal to us the existence of a mental substance. Certainly, the existence 
of such a substance could be inferred. Brentano, however, adopts an ‘empirical standpoint’ in 
psychology: he wants to renounce the positing of inferred objects, as this would make 
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psychology a speculative science. Accordingly, as long as the soul can be avoided in giving 
an analysis of our mental life, it is better not to posit it. (On this strategy with respect to the 
soul, see Textor 2017a, 22–6 and 2017b, as well as Dainton 2017, 62.) What is given to us in 
our inner experience is nothing more than a series of mental acts. Famously, the mark of the 
mental is, for Brentano, intentionality: that is, mental acts have a specific directedness 
towards objects, or more precisely (for the early Brentano), ‘intentional objects’, which are 
mind-dependent entities with a sui generis mode of being, namely, ‘intentional existence’. 
Despite his anti-substantialism, Brentano was also hostile to bundle theories of mental 
life, à la Hume, according to which our mental acts – such as my seeing blue, my hearing F, 
and my awareness of them (to take Textor’s examples) – come in groups of discrete entities. 
Why was Brentano hostile to such theories? One argument against the view, the ‘epistemic 
argument’, found in Brentano and reconstructed by Textor, runs as follows: Our self-
consciousness, or awareness, is evident, and hence infallible. This means that awareness 
necessarily entails the existence of the mental act it is about, for example, a mental act of 
seeing. Now, if our awareness and our other mental act were discrete entities, the only way to 
explain how the latter could relate to the former would be by a causal relation, on the model 
of perception; however, in a causal relation, the effect could always be produced by a cause 
different from the current one, and so awareness would not be infallible (Brentano 1924, 196–
9 and 248–9, and Textor 2017a, 254–61, among others). 
Another argument mentioned by Textor, and also found in Brentano, is the 
‘duplication argument’. It forces the bundle advocate to admit that when we perceive 
something, we present it twice, which is obviously contrary to experience. If, for example, our 
seeing and our awareness of seeing were two distinct acts, our seeing would present us with 
blue a first time, and our awareness would present it a second time. This is due to the fact that 
seeing is a relative entity, which cannot be presented without presenting its correlative, which 
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in the present case is a seen-blue (just as thinking of a slave requires one to think of a master); 
thus, when awareness is directed towards seeing, it should also be directed towards seen-blue, 
and hence blue would be presented twice (1924, 176–80 and 2017a, 93–114, among others).1 
The alternative to the bundle theory in Brentano, according to Textor, is mental 
monism. My seeing, my hearing, and my awareness of my seeing and hearing are not discrete 
entities, but are identical: these acts, which are apparently three different things, are in fact all 
one and the same entity. This solves both of the problems above: the necessity that seeing and 
awareness coexist is established by the fact that they are identical; and there is no duplication 
of objects, since seeing and awareness are just one presentation which presents both blue and 
itself.  
The obvious question that arises, however, is how one can explain the complexity of 
one’s mental life, that is, the fact that my seeing, my hearing, and my awareness seem to be 
different entities. Textor’s answer is: via conceptual distinctions. In other words, one and the 
same act is a hearing, a seeing, and an awareness of them, provided that we conceptually 
distinguish these aspects of the act. And in order to distinguish a hearing, a seeing, and an 
awareness in one and the same act, we have to relate that single act to several different objects 
that appear to the act. Thus, one and the same act, faced with the colour blue and the sound F, 
is a seeing when conceptually related to the colour, a hearing when conceptually related to the 
sound, and an awareness when conceptually related to itself. As Textor says: 
 
Mental acts are metaphysically simple. They don’t contain themselves as detachable parts, but 
can be brought under different concepts with respect to different objects to which they are 
related. (Textor 2017a, 133) 
 
 
1 For a third argument, which Textor labels the ‘argument from comparison’, see Brentano 1924, 226–
228; for a criticism of this argument, see Textor 2017a, 253. 
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Is this conceptualist account Brentano’s own position? There is some textual evidence 
against this reading.2 While Textor treats mental acts as ontologically unitary and simple, 
importing only conceptual complexity in them, Brentano can be found to say that mental acts 
are unitary but not simple. For Brentano, our seeing and hearing, as well as our awareness of 
them, are real parts, or ‘divisives’, of one unitary mental act. Divisives seem to bring in 
ontological complexity. They are not self-standing, existentially autonomous entities – that is, 
they are not discrete items, which would lead to the bundle view – but they are nonetheless 
ontologically distinct. Brentano seems to make this claim in the following passage: 
 
The perception of hearing is not identical with the feeling we have toward hearing. They are 
divisives of the same reality, but this does not make them really identical with it and thus with 
one another. […] a divisive, which I distinguish as a part in a real thing, cannot be called 
identical with this thing and hence with the other divisives which can be distinguished in it. A 
divisive never stands in a relation of real identity with another which has been distinguished 
from it, for if it did it would not be another divisive but the same one. But they do both belong 
to one real entity. And it is this common membership in one real thing which constitutes the 
unity about which we are speaking. (Brentano 1924, 228–9; trans. Rancurello, Terrell, & 
McAlister). 
 
Brentano’s repeated motto about the structure of consciousness is ‘unity is not simplicity’ (see 
1924, 223, 234 and 237), and this seems to be an ontological claim. His divisives thus 
apparently correspond to ontological distinctions, and not to merely conceptual ones. In fact, 
for Brentano, complex items made up of divisives form an ontological middle way between 
simple entities and what he calls ‘collectives’, that is, groups of discrete entities (1924, 222–
 
2 On this I follow Marchesi 2019, who makes a similar point, but against Kriegel 2018b; see also 
Fisette 2015, who rejects the identity reading. 
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3). To be sure, there are passages where Brentano says that one and the same mental act can 
be ‘conceptually’ partitioned by being related to different objects (1924, 179, quoted in 
Textor 2017a, 258, among others), but this is when the parts are treated as discrete entities, 
that is, as self-standing items (see also Marchesi 2019, 133). This conceptual partitioning into 
self-standing items is in turn possible because the act itself is made up of divisives – as 
Dennett would say, the partitioning carves the mind at its joints. 
Textor knows the text quoted above, which is a famous passage in Brentano’s corpus. 
Strikingly, he himself used it in earlier works to defend a variant of the ontological reading of 
Brentano, the ‘constituency thesis’, which was directed precisely against the identity 
interpretation of mental acts and their awareness in Brentano. According to the constituency 
thesis, a mental act of seeing, for example, is a constituent of the act of awareness of the 
seeing; there is thus a mereo-ontological distinction between the two acts (see 2006, esp. 423; 
Textor’s evolution is pointed out in Marchesi 2019, 135). Now, in Textor’s considered view, 
the constituency thesis is a bad philosophical position. Why? He addresses a series of 
objections to it, based on the ‘epistemic argument’ and the ‘duplication argument’. According 
to Textor, the constituency theory would be unable to solve the problems resulting from these 
arguments, and thus proves to be a bad option.  
First, according to Textor, saying that seeing is a part of the awareness of seeing does 
not establish their coexistence, since ‘there are wholes that may have different parts than the 
ones they actually have. The same orchestra is composed at different times of different 
musicians.’ Second, ‘if awareness of hearing F contains hearing F and a distinct 
representation of hearing F, then […] the note F is still presented twice’ (2017a, 126–7; see 
also the reference to Textor 2006 in Textor 2017b, 153n11; the claim that divisives lead to 
duplication is also found in Marchesi 2019, 137).  
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At this point, however, the reader will be tempted to ask: Wasn’t Brentano in fact 
importing ontological complexity into his account of the mind? If he was not, what are we to 
do with texts such as the one quoted above, where he seems to state that divisives are not 
really identical? By contrast, if Brentano was a defender of the constituency thesis or of some 
other kind of ontological division of the mind, wouldn’t it be more ‘Brentanian’ to defend his 
ontological account rather than going for mental monism? 
Let me then try to defend the constituency variant of Brentano’s ontological division 
of the mind, that is, the thesis that awareness of hearing F is a whole which has hearing F as a 
(real) part (or divisive). Regarding the epistemic argument, it seems to me that the necessary 
coexistence of hearing and awareness of hearing is warranted by Brentano’s mereological 
framing itself, that is, simply by the fact that hearing is a part of awareness of hearing. Indeed, 
Brentano apparently thinks that a whole is identical to its parts. This is known as the 
‘composition as identity’ principle, which states that a whole just is its components (see 
Cotnoir 2014, 4). Brentano seems to defend this principle in at least two passages (for the 
ascription of this thesis to Brentano, see Kriegel 2018a, 34, where the two texts are quoted): 
 
To be sure, it would be a strange kind of arithmetic if one were to add to the two entities 
(Wesen) which are individual oxen the one which is two oxen and then to speak of three 
entities. (Brentano 1933, 50; trans. Chisholm & Guterman, modified). 
 
If there are such things as atoms, then each particular atom is a thing and, according to what 
we have said, any three atoms taken together can also be called a thing; but the latter may not 
now be called a fourth thing, for it consists of nothing more than the three atoms and with the 
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positing of each of them in particular it was already given together with the third part (zum 
dritten Teil) (Brentano 1933, 5; trans. Chisholm & Guterman, modified).3 
 
Applied to Brentano’s account of self-consciousness, the principle entails that the whole 
“awareness of hearing” would not be the same whole if its part “hearing” were not there. 
Thus, necessarily without hearing there is no awareness of hearing.4 
Textor resists this, and holds that wholes can lose their parts while remaining the 
same. His example, mentioned above, is that of an orchestra: you can replace one musician 
and still have the same orchestra. Now, I think that counterexamples such as this are based on 
an entanglement of wholes that equivocally bear the same name; once you disentangle them, 
the ‘composition as identity’ principle can still hold. In the example, there is a distinction to 
be made between the orchestra as an instrumental setting and the orchestra as a group of 
musicians: obviously, you don’t change the instrumental-orchestra if you replace one 
musician, although you do change the musicians-orchestra; the replacement of one musician 
is not relevant for the whole that is the instrumental-orchestra, and thus there is indeed no 
change in this orchestra; but the reason is that no musician is a part of the instrumental-
orchestra. However, musician-orchestras clearly also exist: when one says that the Berlin 
Philharmonic is a good orchestra, what one means are the musicians, not the instrumental 
setting (exactly the same setting could exist elsewhere). 
 
3 Since both texts are from Brentano’s Kategorienlehre, edited by Alfred Kastil, who is not a reliable 
editor, I have compared the texts with the original manuscripts, and they differ only on formal details; 
see respectively M35, n. 30365, and M71, n. 30845. 
4 The ‘composition as identity’ principle is by no means unanimously accepted. Indeed, it has been 
attacked from various sides since its appearance in contemporary discussion on mereology in the 
works of Donald Baxter and David Lewis; one of the objection made against it is that some of its 
variants seem to violate the principle of indiscernibles (for a presentation of these issues, and for 
recent attempts to defend the thesis, see Cotnoir and Baxter 2014). Further work on Brentano would 
be needed to see which precise variant of the thesis he adopts and how he combines it with his 
endorsement of the principle of indiscernibles (on this endorsement, see below). I am grateful to Mark 
Textor for our exchanges about the ‘composition as identity’ principle. 
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Regarding the duplication problem, it also seems to me that Brentano’s account is 
immune to it. To be sure, awareness of seeing blue needs to represent both seeing and seen-
blue, whereas seeing represents blue. But the constituency theory allows us to avoid 
duplication. Indeed, since awareness of seeing blue has seeing blue as a part, its presentation 
of blue is provided to it by that part. What awareness adds to blue (as presented to itself by its 
“seeing” part) is the relation of being-seen. In other words, there is a ‘division of intentional 
labour’: the “seeing” part in the awareness of seeing blue is responsible for presenting blue, 
while the awareness presents seeing plus being-seen, the latter relation being added to blue by 
awareness, which treats it as a correlate of seeing. Although this complex framing is not 
stated explicitly in Brentano, I think that it is reasonable to attribute it to him. A passage by 
Brentano himself, and one by his most faithful student Marty, both quoted by Textor (2017a, 
103), seem to allude to this: 
 
[…] the presentation of the tone is connected with the presentation of the presentation of the 
tone in such a peculiarly intimate way that, if it obtains, its being contributes inwardly to the 
being of the other (Brentano 1924, 179; trans. Rancurello, Terrell, & McAlister, modified by 
Textor). 
 
[…] the presentation of the tone and the presentation of the presentation of the tone are not 
two, but one act. The first presentation coalesces in the second and is so intimately connected 
with it that it contributes to its being (Marty 2011, 28; trans. Textor).  
 
According to Brentano then, seeing ‘contributes to the being’ of awareness of seeing. What 
does this mean? In my opinion, it confirms the ‘division of intentional labour’ interpretation. 
Indeed, how better to contribute to the being of a mental act – that is, of something which is 
essentially intentional – than by providing it with part of its intentional directedness? Thus, it 
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seems to me that Brentano’s ontological division of the mind is immune to Textor’s 
arguments. 
 
b. Some Objections to Mental Monism 
Independently of exegetical issues about Brentano, however, one might like to ask whether 
Textor’s position, mental monism, is defensible in itself. A position such as his, in contrast to 
the divisives account, treats our mental life as an unshaped material from a strictly ontological 
point of view (see also Dewalque 2017). But then the conceptual distinctions that one can 
draw in a given mental act might seem arbitrary. Indeed, if there is nothing ontological in my 
act that is responsible for its being divided into seeing blue and hearing F, why couldn’t one 
say that my current act is in fact just a case of seeing blue, or perhaps an act of seeing blue 
and simultaneously tasting bitterness? What would rule out tracing conceptual distinctions in 
the act other than those of seeing blue and hearing F? 
Textor’s answer, obviously, is that the constraints on the kinds of conceptual 
distinction that one can make depend on the sorts of object to which a mental act is related.5 
These are supposed to bring objective (i.e. non-arbitrary) complexity into the picture. 
According to Textor, a mental act has a ‘plural reference’, like the demonstrative ‘these’ 
(2017a, 116–8): it can refer to blue, to F, and to itself. It is also a ‘multi-grade relation’, that 
is, the number of its relata can vary: it could refer just to blue and to itself (2017a, 262). 
Arguably, this brings in no ontological complexity at the level of the act: my act can be 
described as a seeing, a hearing, and an awareness simply via this one relation which relates it 
to blue, to F, and to itself. It does, however, bring in ontological complexity elsewhere, 
namely, at the level of the relata: three relata, hence three sub-acts. (See the interesting 
 
5 For an alternative solution, see Kriegel 2018a and b, where mental acts in Brentano are said to have 
various structures which allow different descriptions of them. 
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comparison with the identification of actions in 2017a, 267–70.) Now, one obvious difference 
between the plural reference of a demonstrative such as ‘these’ and a mental act is that a 
mental act refers to several objects in several ways: hearing, seeing, etc. How does Textor 
account for this? The answer is again: by the objects. He writes: ‘The act is an awareness of a 
colour, hence it is a seeing; the act is an awareness of a sound, hence it is a hearing’ (2017a, 
251–2). One might also want to ask as well: What about cases in which the objects do not 
exist, as in hallucinations? Textor’s answer seems to be: In these cases, it is intentional 
objects that do the job (Textor 2017a, 269–70). 
I have two worries here. First, the explanation about the diversification of our mental 
life seem to me to be in tension with another claim of Textor’s, namely, his rejection of 
intentionality as the mark of the mental, in other words, his opposition to Brentano’s thesis 
that all mental acts are object-directed. Although Textor does not provide a general 
classification of mental acts, nor a list of which are intentional and which non-intentional, he 
criticises the idea that propositional attitudes are object-directed (see 2017a, 80–4). Now, it is 
not easy to see how Textor’s explanation about the diversification of our mental life is to be 
combined with his rejection of intentionality as the mark of the mental. For if the various 
aspects of our mental life are to be distinguished by their relation to different objects, yet 
some of our mental acts are not object-directed, how then are these latter mental acts to be 
identified? Here it seems to me that either the conceptual distinctions we draw become 
arbitrary, or Textor has to provide some candidate other than objects to establish objectivity. 
If I am right, more information would be needed both about those acts which Textor takes to 
be intentional and about his way of picking out those which are not intentional, for which 
objects are therefore of no help. Brentano – or at least my Brentano – with his account of 
divisives, does not face any problem here (not to mention the fact that he adopts intentionality 
as the mark of the mental). 
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My second worry is that it is not clear how mental acts whose objects do not exist are 
to be identified using intentional objects. In fact, despite the strategic role that intentional 
objects play in mental monism, the account of them in Textor’s book is not developed in full 
detail. In my view, a more precise explanation about the nature and mode of being of these 
objects would be needed. To be sure, according to Textor (2017a, 54 and 73), Brentano is a 
primitivist about intentionality, and this also holds for his account of intentional objects: they 
do not explain intentionality, but their mention there is simply to point out the specific kind of 
experience Brentano wants us to attend to, namely, intentionality. Textor also asserts, 
however, that this does not stop the inquiry, since it is still legitimate to ask what ontological 
framework applies to intentionality. Now, as Textor says, he does not want to ‘pursue the 
question’, and suggests that he might even go for adverbialism (2017a, 77), which does not 
posit intentional objects. In the final analysis, then, it is not clear whether Textor takes 
intentional objects to exist (as affirmed in passing at 2017a, 75) or whether they are merely a 
way of speaking. But if they are merely a way of speaking, where then should we find an 
objective criterion to distinguish the various aspects of our mental acts about non-existent 
objects? What could justify the various conceptual distinctions that we draw other than 
ontological complexity at the level of the relata? Again, for (my) Brentano, a mental act has 
real parts, and so there is no problem in distinguishing our different thoughts about non-
existent objects. 
  
3. The Individuation of Mental Acts 
Why did Brentano include a mental substance, namely, the ‘soul’, in his philosophy of mind? 
According to Textor (2017a, 246–72), he was led to adopt the notion of a soul by the 
‘separability challenge’; in order for this problem to arise, however, one must start with a 
Brentano taken as a mental monist. The idea is this: if my seeing blue and my hearing F are 
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identical, how could I continue to see blue while no longer hearing F? Seeing blue should not 
survive the disappearance of hearing F (or hearing F should still be there). According to 
Textor, the mental monist can in fact give a solution to this problem, by appealing to objects: 
my act fits the description of seeing blue and hearing F if I can relate it to blue and to F; if it 
were related to only one of those objects, it would fit only one of the two descriptions. 
But what about the alternative Brentano, the one who seems to introduce ontological 
complexity – that is, divisives – into the act? Strikingly, the early Brentano explicitly 
mentions his theory of divisives as an answer to the separability challenge. The idea is that a 
mental act can lose some of its parts without being destroyed. In other words, there are 
different kinds of ontological dependency between a mental act’s divisives: some divisives 
can be separated from the others without destroying them, while some other divisives cannot 
be separated without the others being destroyed, and no divisive can survive alone (in contrast 
to discrete entities, which are existentially autonomous, and thus survive being separated from 
a collective). Brentano does not give much explanation about the way this works, but he 
provides a parallel case of such relations: take an atom, consider its two halves, which are two 
divisives, and add another divisive, namely its movement. Now, the atom could lose one of 
the divisives, namely movement – which could not stand alone, by the way – and still exist, 
but it could not lose one of its halves. The same holds for seeing blue, hearing F, and being 
aware of them: the act could lose either of the two first parts, but not the third, while none of 
these parts could survive alone (see Brentano 1924, 230–1 and 235; for a defence of this view, 
see Dainton 2017 and Giustina 2017).6 
 
6 Note that Brentano stresses that he does not want to commit himself to the existence of atoms, and 
presents this scenario merely as an illustration of his point. One might be unhappy with the claim that 
the two halves of an atom are ontologically distinct, since one might argue that these two portions as 
portions do not exist in reality, but only in thought. Yet although the example is perhaps not well 
chosen, it is still clear that divisives are ontologically distinct for Brentano, as the movement part of 
the atom shows. Another Brentanian example of divisives, which resembles that of the two halves of 
the atom, since it is about two mutually dependent parts, is that of colour and extension: neither of 
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Later, however, as Textor emphasises, Brentano modified his view on the structure of 
consciousness, borrowing an Aristotelian ontological framework. On Brentano’s later view, 
my seeing blue and my hearing F are two accidents of one and the same mental substance; 
that is, they are ontologically distinct entities but share the substance as one of their parts and 
thus have ‘substantial identity’ (as Textor says, 2017a, 265). The mental substance, that is, the 
soul, can exist without these accidents, and each of these accidents can exist without the other, 
but none of them can exist without the mental substance (see Brentano LS1b).7  
Did Brentano introduce the soul in order to solve the separability challenge? This may 
be so, but I must confess that I would need a bit more development from Textor in order to be 
convinced of this. Specifically, I would need a discussion of the text mentioned above about 
divisives, one that would show me either that Brentano defended the identity view in this text, 
or that he did not but that the sort of ontological complexity presented there was unable to 
meet the separability challenge.  
But if it was not meant to meet the separability challenge, for what purpose did 
Brentano introduce the soul into his philosophy? Clearly, I owe the reader an alternative 
explanation. One answer might be that he wanted to transpose his system of ontological 
dependencies into a more familiar theoretical framework, in order to cancel the impression of 
an ad hoc move (Brentano LS1b; see also the reframing of his account in Brentano 1982, 12).  
Another explanation, which seems more plausible to me, is that Brentano introduced 
the soul in order to individuate mental acts. It is clear at any rate that he uses mental substance 
as an individuator (see also Textor 2017b). As he states:  
 
 
them can exist alone, though they are obviously not really identical (see, e.g., 1982, 14–20). This 
hopefully confirms that divisives are not just conceptually distinct in Brentano. 
7 I thank Guillaume Fréchette for sending me a transcription of this manuscript. 
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Specifically similar acts are individually distinct when they are mine or someone else’s. The 
individualiser is the subject. (Brentano 1993, 33) 
 
The idea is that when you and I have an act that is the same in specie – a belief, for example – 
something additional is needed to account for the fact that your act and mine are distinct 
particulars. For Brentano, this something is the soul: every individual mental substance has its 
own qualitative distinction, which thus is a part of each mental act and individuates it (see 
Brentano 1993, as well as LS1b). Why this move? It seems to me that Brentano has no other 
solution to account for the individuation of mental acts. Let me try to sketch out the idea 
enough to show that it is at least plausible.8 
Brentano seems to reject the thesis that a mental act is individuated by its object, be it 
an external object or an intentional one. Or at any rate, the claim that the object cannot 
individuate the act is found in a text published under Brentano’s name, on the basis of his 
manuscripts, by Alfred Kastil, one of his most orthodox students. The claim is simply that you 
and I could both have a mental act directed towards the same object, and that these acts would 
thus not be individuated by the object (Brentano 1954, 217–8). Individuation by an intentional 
object, on the other hand, seems to reverse the order of explanation: for Brentano (1982, 21), 
intentional objects appear and disappear not by themselves, but concomitantly with the acts of 
which they are the correlates, and so they seem to owe their individuation to the acts, not the 
acts to them. 
Would Brentano accept something like spatiotemporal individuation of mental acts? 
This seems to be ruled out by his mind-body dualism: mental acts, in contrast to bodies, are 
not spatialised (on the mind-body problem and dualism, see Brentano 1954). Supposing that 
mental acts are not spatialised, couldn’t they be individuated by temporality alone? This too 
 
8 I discuss these issues in more detail in my paper ‘Brentano on the Individuation of Mental Acts’. 
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seems difficult: you and I could have the same mental act about the same object at the same 
time (see also Textor 2017b, 149). But couldn’t mental acts be spatialized thanks to the body 
with which they are connected? In the Brentanian framework, mental acts are related to their 
underlying bodies by a causal relation (see Marty 2011, 33). But then, couldn’t the causal 
relation to my body serve to spatialise my act and thus allow for spatiotemporal 
individuation? Perhaps, but Brentano believes in the immortality of our mental life, and thus 
in its persistence after the destruction of our body; and I presume that he wants our mental 
acts still to be individuated in the afterlife, hence his reluctance to explain any kind of 
individuation via the body. (On Brentano’s philosophy of religion, see again the texts in 
1954.) 
What about primitive individuation? According to such a view, your mental acts and 
mine are individuated in themselves, and this fact does not require any further explanation. 
This is an option for the individuation of tropes in contemporary philosophy (see Maurin 
2018); couldn’t it be used to individuate mental acts? In fact, primitive individuation is 
usually taken to violate the principle of indiscernibles (in its ontological version), since it 
allows two qualitatively identical items to differ numerically (Maurin 2002, 83–7). However, 
Brentano defends (the ontological version of) the principle of indiscernibles (1992–1993, 
261). I therefore tend to think that he would be opposed to primitive individuation. 
Given all these constraints, Brentano chooses to individuate mental acts via their 
bearers. This would thus be at least one major reason, if not the reason, for the introduction of 
a mental substance into his philosophy of mind; and it provides an alternative to the 
‘separability challenge’ narrative.9 
 
9 The options for individuation listed here are not meant to be exhaustive, but bearer individuation, 
spatiotemporal individuation, and primitive individuation are three standard ways of individuating 
tropes in contemporary philosophy, as stated in Maurin 2018. 
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But which account is better: the account with divisives or the substance account? In 
my opinion, the older view is better, for the substance account seems to be called into 
question both by the epistemic and the duplication arguments, as Textor claims (2017a, 266). 
It was important, in Brentano’s earlier account, that the awareness of a mental act have this 
act as a part: first, because it connected the act to its awareness necessarily, thus establishing 
the infallibility of awareness; and second, because it allowed the act to take on some of the 
‘intentional labour’ of awareness, thus avoiding a situation in which awareness presents the 
object of the act a second time. Now, in the substance account, although it is not clear to me 
whether awareness is a part of the mental substance or whether it is an additional accident 
which contains the substance as a part (as Textor 2017a, 266 argues), what is clear is that the 
awareness of a mental act does not have this act as a part. In other words, as it stands, the 
substance view is weaker in the face of the epistemic and duplication arguments. Brentano’s 
earlier account, which is better prepared to defend itself against them, is therefore to be 
preferred. As well, I would say that not much would be lost from a philosophical point of 
view, since one might happily renounce the afterlife in favour of individuating one’s mental 
acts via the body. 
In sum, in this paper I have challenged Textor’s mental monism, which is at the core 
of his fascinating Brentanian-minded contribution to contemporary philosophy of mind. I 
have argued first that the early Brentano defends another position, which imports ontological 
complexity into the mind, and which is immune to Textor’s objections to similar views. 
Second, I have argued that it is not due to problems deriving from mental monism that 
Brentano later introduces a mental substance in his theory; rather, it is due to problems 
deriving from individuation. I nevertheless argue, as Textor does, that Brentano’s earlier view 
(understood in my sense) is better than his later account. 
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